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WHERE CORPORATIONS ARE: WHY CASUAL VISITS TO NEW 
YORK ARE BAD FOR BUSINESS 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* & David Gray Carlson** 
Some time prior to 1881, the president of the Terre Haute Car & 
Manufacturing Co. was traveling through New York on his way to a 
seaside resort when he was served with process in a civil suit 
against his company. 1 The president was "not in his official 
capacity or upon any business of the defendant."2 The company, 
''being a foreign corporation, had no place of business, and 
transacted no business, and had no property within this State."3 
Most lawyers today would say that New York courts could not 
compel this corporation to stand trial in New York. But, this being 
the nineteenth century, before the days of International Shoe v. 
Washington, 4 the New York Court of Appeals in Pope v. Terre Haute 
Car & Manufacturing Co. happily imposed jurisdiction on the 
corporation.5 It never occurred to the Pope court that the United 
States Constitution might constitute the slightest impediment to 
the imposition of jurisdiction.6 
After International Shoe, such a holding became unthinkable. 
International Shoe involved a tax on businesses employing 
salesmen within the state.7 A corporation had resident salesmen 
and a showroom in Washington.8 The state commenced litigation 
against the corporation by serving process on its salesmen and 
mailing notice to International Shoe in St. Louis. 9 The Supreme 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Special thanks to Dan Korff-
Korn for excellent research help. 
1 Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137, 139 (1881). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 lnt'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
s Pope, 87 N.Y. at 141. 
6 See id. at 139-41. 
7 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 321. 
s Id. at 314-15. 
9 Id. at 312. 
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Court upheld jurisdiction of the Washington courts because the 
defendant had "minimum contacts with [Washington] such that the 
maintenance of the suit [ did] not offend 'traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice."'10 In so holding, the Court remarked 
that "the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct 
of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's 
behalf [would not have been] enough to subject it to suit on causes 
of action unconnected with the activities there."11 
Many examples-three at the United States Supreme Court 
level-can be given in which the casual visit by an officer of a 
corporation that was not otherwise doing business in New York was 
an insufficient peg on which to hang the hat of New York 
jurisdiction.12 The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 
summarizes the matter in the following illustration: 
A brings an action in state X against the B corporation 
which was incorporated in state Y. Process is served in X 
upon C, the president of the B corporation, who happens to 
be temporarily in X on his own private business. The court 
does not thereby acquire jurisdiction over B.13 
It would appear Pope is no longer infallible law in New York. Yet, 
in 2010, the New York Court of Appeals in Hotel 71 Mezz Lender 
LLC v. Falor14 revived its holding in Pope and once again took the 
10 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (other citations omitted). 
11 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added) (citing Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. 
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 359, 360 (1882); Frene v. 
Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1943)). 
12 Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 171, 173 (1923) (serving while 
present temporarily in New York); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 
517 (1923); Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 266, 269 (1917) (lacking 
jurisdiction when the President was present in New York on personal affairs); Brocia v. 
Franklin Plan Corp., 235 A.D. 421, 422, 423, 257 N.Y.S. 167, 168, 169 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 
1932) (visiting city in state does meet threshold for personal jurisdiction); Seaboard Fruit 
Distrib., Inc. v. Carlton-Moore Co., 199 A.D. 612, 616, 617, 192 N.Y.S. 82, 84, 85 (App. Div. 
1st Dep't 1922); Sunrise Lumber Co. v. Homer D. Biery Lumber Co., 195 A.D. 170, 173, 185 
N.Y.S. 711, 712-13 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1921); Trautman v. Taylor-Adams Co., 141 Misc. 500, 
501, 503, 252 N.Y.S. 701, 702, 704 (Manhattan Mun. Ct. 1931). The federal cases involving 
federal question jurisdiction commenced in the Southern District of New York. In modern 
times, this lawsuit would be governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(l)(A), which 
holds that "(s]erving a summons ... establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) 
who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the 
district court is located." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(A). Similar statutes were in effect in the 
1920s. Rule 4(k)(l)(A) indicates that any limitation on the supreme court of New York 
becomes a limitation on the Southern District of New York. See Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & 
Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1411-12 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 42 illus. 1 (1971). 
14 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698 
(2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
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position that a casual visit to New York by a company officer is 
quite enough · to sustain personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
company not otherwise doing business in New York. 15 Pope lives 
again, as if International Shoe had never happened. 
How could the Falor court have turned back the clock to the 
primitive days of 1881, ignoring the minimum contacts requirement 
for bringing foreign businesses under New York jurisdiction? The 
answer is that, given the confused facts of Falor, it is likely the 
court failed to appreciate the logical predicates of its own holding. 16 
The case involved a pre-judgment order of attachment.17 It seemed 
to be an exercise in quasi in rem jurisdiction.18 The Falor court 
therefore viewed the controversy as involving jurisdiction over 
things, not over persons. 19 Nevertheless, Falor was indeed a holding 
on in personam jurisdiction over a business with no minimum 
contacts with New York.20 It stands for the proposition that casual 
visits to New York by company agents can, without anything more, 
submit the company to New York jurisdiction.21 A company officer 
that flies to New York to take in a Broadway show threatens to put 
his company at the mercy of the New York courts. 
Because the Falor decision ignores at least three direct holdings 
and one dictum of the United States Supreme Court that casual 
visits by an officer do not, without more, imply jurisdiction over the 
company, Falor must be viewed as bad law.22 It should not be 
followed or cited in New York or other states. It probably should 
not even be accorded res judicata respect in New York or full faith 
and credit in other states.23 
But there is more! The Falor court re-defines the word 
"possession" in New York personal property law, so that it 
15 Id. at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
1s See id. 
17 Id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
18 Id. at 311, 926 N.E.2d at 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
19 Id. at 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (emphasis added) ("The provisional 
remedy of attachment, which is governed by CPLR article 62, operates only against the 
property of the defendant, not on his/her person."). 
20 Id. at 311-12, 926 N.E.2d at 1207-08, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
21 Id. 
22 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. 
Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 
516, 518 (1923); Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917). 
23 Carter G. Bishop, LLC Charging Orders: A Jurisdictional and Governing Law 
Quagmire, 12 J. Bus. ENTITIES 14, 21 (2010) ("If personal jurisdiction over the LLC is 
required and does not exist in the state of the judgment where a creditor seeks a charging 
order, the LLC would presumably be privileged to ignore the order even if it is domesticated 
in the LLC's state of formation."). 
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encompasses intangible property.24 It does so because it felt 
compelled by the United States Constitution to so define it. 25 We 
shall show that this is completely erroneous. The Constitution does 
not require the states to adopt a specific theory of property.26 
In short, the Falor court violates the Constitution by imposing 
jurisdiction over a company with no minimum contacts with New 
York. In addition, it purports to change New York property law 
based on a non-existent constitutional principle. 
To establish these propositions, this article is divided into six 
parts. First, we review the confusing facts in Falor, emphasizing 
that the source of confusion was the fact that the "proper garnishee" 
in the case had consented to New York jurisdiction for himself, but 
not for the entities of which he was agent. 27 Second, we review the 
nature of prejudgment attachment in New York, much humbled 
since Shaffer v. Heitner required that a defendant have minimum 
contacts with a state before a quasi in rem jurisdiction can be 
asserted against his things. 28 Third, we review the little understood 
law of uncertificated securities and limited liability company (LLC) 
interests, which is crucial to the case. Fourth, we examine the 
paradox of one person being both a defendant in a lawsuit and a 
garnishee under an order of attachment-mutually exclusive 
categories under New York law. Fifth, we review the new definition 
of the word "possession" introduced by the Falor case and show how 
this definition supplants the definition in the famous case of Harris 
v. Balk.29 Ironically, having supplanted the old definition of 
"possession," the Falor court actually uses Harris v. Balk to change 
the New York law of situs of intangible property. 30 That is, the 
Falor court simultaneously disregards and relies on this classic old 
chestnut. Finally, we set forth the theory of in personam 
jurisdiction operable in Falor and show that it is unconstitutional. 
We examine what this means for res judicata in the case going 
24 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 310-12, 926 N.E.2d at 1207-08, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702-04. 
25 Id. at 311, 926 N.E.2d at 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (pointing out due process 
restrictions on quasi in rem jurisdiction as set out in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 
(1977), and discussing how attachment can serve purposes of obtaining quasi in rem 
jurisdiction over a person with intangible property in the state). 
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (directing that powers not expressly granted to the United 
States by the Constitution are reserved for the States). 
27 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 58 A.D.3d 270, 272, 273, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62, 64, 
rev'd, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2010). "Repayment of this loan was 
personally guaranteed by appellants." Id. at 273, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (emphasis added). 
28 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. 
29 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
3° Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 314-16, 926 N.E.2d at 1209-11, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 705-07. 
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forward and for full faith and credit in other states. 
I. THE FACTS IN FALOR 
The circumstances of Falor are so confusing that the Court of 
Appeals likely did not understand it was asserting in personam 
jurisdiction over a foreign company with no minimum contacts in 
New York. 
Guy T. Mitchell was a real estate developer in Florida and the 
leader of a group of investors.31 Their enterprises were organized 
via twenty-two limited liability companies chartered in Delaware, 
Georgia, and Florida. 32 Mitchell and the other investors owned the 
equity interests in these LLCs. 33 In addition, Mitchell was the one-
hundred percent shareholder of a regular Florida corporation. 34 
Some years before, the investors established an additional LLC-
not one of the twenty-three garnishees just mentioned-to acquire a 
hotel in Chicago.35 To finance this enterprise, the Chicago LLC 
borrowed money from yet another LLC, Mezz Lender LLC, who 
would be the plaintiff in the ensuing litigation.36 As to this loan, all 
the investors, including Mitchell, signed a guaranty contract in 
their individual capacities. 37 In the contract, the defendants 
"submitted to the jurisdiction of any federal or state court in New 
York City in any suit, action or proceeding arising out of or relating 
to the guaranty."38 Significantly, the twenty-three garnishees were 
not parties to this guaranty.39 
The meaning of this agreement was that Mitchell was both a 
private defendant in his own right and the president of all the 
entities in which the defendants-including Mitchell-owned equity 
interests. Mitchell operated in two capacities, one as private citizen 
and the other as corporate fiduciary of twenty-three garnishees.40 It 
was this dual capacity that apparently confused the New York 
31 See Falor, 58 A.D.3d at 272, 273, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 62, 64; id. at 277, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 66 
(Saxe, J., dissenting). Besides Mitchell, the defendants include Robert D. Falor, David Falor, 
Chris M. Falor, Jennifer Falor and Geoffrey L. Hockman. Id. at 277, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 66. 
32 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. Eight of the LLCs were chartered in Florida, nine in Georgia, and five in Delaware. 
Falor, 58 A.D.3d at 277, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 67. 
35 See Falor, 58 A.D.3d at 272, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (majority opinion). 
36 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
37 Id. 
3s Id. 
39 See Falor, 58 A.D.3d at 272, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 62. 
40 See id. at 273, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 64. 
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Court of Appeals as to the impact and significance of International 
Shoe. 
The Chicago enterprise soon turned sour and the Chicago LLC 
was bankrupt.41 The plaintiff brought suit in Supreme Court, New 
York County against all of the defendants on their guaranty 
obligation.42 
In this litigation, the plaintiff sought to take the deposition of 
Mitchell.43 Simultaneously, it sought an order of attachment 
against property of the defendants. 44 The plaintiffs idea was to 
place a lien on the equity interests of all the defendants in the LLCs 
and in Mitchell's wholly-owned corporation.45 In an ex parte 
hearing, the supreme court granted the order of attachment in an ex 
parte proceeding, but the court delayed levy by the sheriff until 
after a hearing on the merits of the attachment.46 
Meanwhile, Mitchell came to New York to attend the requested 
deposition, which was held in the supreme court's Manhattan 
courthouse.47 The deposition was scheduled just before the hearing 
on the order of attachment.48 
After the deposition recessed, Mitchell personally attended the 
attachment hearing.49 At the hearing, the court approved the order 
of attachment.50 On the spot, with the court's permission, a sheriffs 
deputy served Mitchell with the order of attachment.51 
II. ATTACHMENT IN NEW YORK 
Once glorious and powerful, quasi in rem jurisdiction has become 
a mediocre backwater. In the golden age of the "power" theory of 
jurisdiction, a state could render judgment if it had power over a 
defendant or over a defendant's property.52 New York in particular 
41 Id. at 272, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 62. The plaintiff sought to recover $65,149,926. Id. at 272-
73, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 63. Judgment would eventually be entered at $52,404,066.54. Falor, 14 
N.Y.2d at 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
42 Falor, 14 N.Y.2d at 307-08, 926 N.E.2d at 1204-05, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
43 Id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01. 
46 Id.; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6211(a) (McKinney 2013) ("An order of attachment may be granted 
without notice, before or after service of the summons and at any time prior to judgment."). 
47 See Falor, 14 N.Y.2d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 




52 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is 
physical power .... ") (citing Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 326, 353 (1913)); Ferry, 228 
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raised quasi in rem jurisdiction to a high art when it permitted 
garnishments of· national insurance companies, even though the 
underlying tort against which the insurance company had insured 
bore no connection with New York.53 
The "power" theory soon found competition from the "minimum 
contacts" theory of International Shoe v. Washington, which turned 
on fairness, rather than on power.54 For our purposes, the theory of 
International Shoe may be expressed as follows: if a defendant 
enjoys the benefit of a state's legal protection, then it is fair that the 
defendant suffer(the burden of answering claims against it in that 
state.55 
These two theories-power and fairness-are at war with each 
other.56 And one casualty of this contradiction was the power of a 
state to base jurisdiction on the capture of the defendant's things. 
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court barred quasi in rem 
jurisdiction unless there was also in personam jurisdiction over the 
defendant in the minimum contacts sense. 57 
As a result of Shaffer, lawyerly interest in prejudgment 
attachment has plummeted. With regard to New York's statutory 
regime, prejudgment attachment has become a way to obtain 
collateral for some future judgment. 58 In effect, it provides a 
nonconsensual lien to secure the claims of otherwise unsecured 
U.S. at 353 ("Ordinarily jurisdiction over a person is based on the power of the sovereign 
asserting it to seize that person and imprison him to await the sovereign's pleasure. But ... 
we dispense with the necessity of maintaining the physical power and attribute the same 
force to the judgment or decree whether the party remain within thejurisdiction or not. This 
is one of the decencies of civilization that no one would dispute."); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, 
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 
284 (1983) ("[A] power theory could justify the assertion of jurisdiction when a legal order has 
no present hold over the defendant on the ground that, at some future time, it may acquire 
power over him or his property."). 
53 This was accomplished in the notorious case of Seider v. Roth, where a New York 
resident sued a Montreal driver for an accident in Vermont by attaching the insurance 
company's obligation to defend the driver, where the insurance company was present and 
doing business in New York. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 112, 216 N.E.2d 312, 313, 269 
N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1966), overruled by Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). Though 
Seider was effectively overruled, nevertheless, the case continues to have a strange and 
lingering effect on New York civil procedure. See David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money 
Judgment (Part Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 43, 91-95, 
104-06 (2009). 
54 Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
55 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). 
56 See Von Mehren, supra note 52, at 285. 
57 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206, 212 (1977). Incomprehensibly, even though 
minimum contacts have trumped power over things, it has not done so over persons, according 
to a plurality of the Supreme Court. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
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creditors. 59 The Falor court thought (erroneously) that collateral-
not jurisdiction-was the only thing at stake in the dispute before 
it.60 
Having collateral is no small thing, in a nation where the average 
bankruptcy dividend to non-priority unsecured creditors approaches 
zero.61 But New York and federal law combine to reduce the value 
of prejudgment attachment. First of all-by New York law-a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant is either a crook62 or a 
foreigner, 63 equally loathsome in the eyes of New York CPLR. 
'Honest' domiciliaries are quite immune from attachment, even if 
they are broke.64 In a case of a crook or a foreigner, a New York 
court apparently has discretion to deny prejudgment attachment, if 
it does not think the plaintiff needs collateral.65 
59 Id. at 47-48. 
60 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 312, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1208, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 703 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008) 
("This is not a case where attachment was used to confer quasi in rem jurisdiction over a 
nondomiciliary based on his/her in-state property. This attachment only served a security 
function (to ensure there would be sufficient money to satisfy a judgment if plaintiff 
prevailed)."). 
61 See, e.g., Dividend to Unsecured Creditors, FABRICIOUS L. BANKR., 
http://www.eastwakebankruptcy.com/bankruptcy-glossary/dividend-unsecured-creditors (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
62 On this prong, the plaintiff must show: 
2. the defendant resides or is domiciled in the state and cannot be personally served 
despite diligent efforts to do so; or 
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement of a 
judgment that might be rendered in plaintiffs favor, has assigned, disposed of, 
encumbered or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to do any of 
these acts; or 
4. the action is brought by the victim or the representative of the victim of a crime .... 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6201 (McKinney 2013). 
63 Here, the plaintiff must show that 
1. the defendant is a nondomiciliary residing without the state, or is a foreign 
corporation not qualified to do business in the state; or ... 
5. the cause of action is based on a judgment, decree or order of a court of the United 
States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state, or on a 
judgment which qualifies for recognition under the provisions of article 53. 
Id. Article 53 is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
5301-09 (McKinney 2013). 
64 See C.P.L.R. 6201. 
65 See, e.g., Ames v. Clifford, 863 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted) 
("New York courts have required an additional showing that something, whether it is a 
defendant's financial position or past and present conduct, poses a real risk to the 
enforceability of a future judgment."). The Ames court went so far as to suggest that, in the 
absence of such discretion, New York law might violate the constitutional right of non• 1 
domiciliaries to equal protection of the laws. Id. See also Thornapple Assocs., Inc. v. 
Sahagen, No. 06 Civ. 6412(JFK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17370, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) 
(finding that the court may still deny prejudgment attachment even if the plaintiff meets the 
statutory requirements of CPLR sections 6201(1) and 6212(a)); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. 
Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that it is up to the 
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Second, even where a plaintiff manages to wheedle a prejudgment 
lien from the New York courts, such a lien is void as a preference in 
a federal bankruptcy if the debtor files a bankruptcy petition shortly 
after the lien is created.66 It is no doubt typically the case that a 
lawsuit is triggered precisely because a debtor is insolvent and 
cannot pay.67 Under these circumstances, the prejudgment 
attachment lien may simply serve to provoke a bankruptcy case.68 
Because the Falor court is a prejudgment attachment case, it is 
tempting to ignore it for the reason that it poles its way through in 
the foetid, insalubrious backwaters of a law that few people really 
care about anymore. But appearances are deceiving; there is an 
important overlap between quasi in rem and in personam 
jurisdiction. 
The overlap is this: if a defendant's property is an intangible debt 
owed to the defendant by a garnishee, then in rem jurisdiction over 
this debt depends on New York's in personam jurisdiction over the 
garnishee. As Professor Walter Kennedy long ago observed: 
If the garnishee were a foreign corporation, additional proof 
that the garnishee expressly or impliedly submitted to the 
laws of [New York] must be furnished before the creditor 
could validly subject the foreign corporation to the process of 
this state. These basic ingredients must be satisfied as 
preliminary conditions in order to reach this same debt by 
way of attachment; the right of the plaintiff to garnish is a 
derivative right which he must trace out through the 
defendant. The garnishee being a non-resident, orthodox 
principles of the common law and the constitutional mandate 
of due process will prevent the principal plaintiff from 
reaching over the head of the defendant and seizing the 
latter's credits in the hands of a non-resident garnishee.69 
It is precisely into this overlap that the Falor holding fits. 
discretion of the courts to deny prejudgment attachments); Reading & Bates Corp. v. Nat'l 
Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discussing that the court has 
discretion over the remedy of attachment); Maitrejean v. Levon Props. Corp., 45 A.D.2d 1020, 
1020-21, 358 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974) (reversing supreme court for 
granting a lien against a foreign corporation, where corporation was highly liquid); see also 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6223(a) (McKinney 2013) ("If, after the defendant has appeared in the action, 
the court determines that the attachment is unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff, it 
shall vacate the order of attachment.") . 
66 11 u.s.c. § 547(1)) (2006). 
67 See In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 919 (7th Cir. 1991). 
6s Id. 
69 Walter B. Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York, 35 YALE L.J. 689, 693 
(1926) (footnotes omitted). 
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Because Falor inhabits this intersection between quasi in rem and 
in personam jurisdiction, whatever law Falor establishes applies 
fully to any in personam claim by any New York plaintiff against 
any foreign debtor. 70 In effect, Falor stands for the proposition that 
any state with power over a corporate agent has power over the 
corporation, even if the agent's presence in New York is completely 
unrelated to the scope of the agent's authority.71 
III. UNCERTIFICATED SECURITIES 
An important fact in Falor is that none of the twenty-three 
garnishees issued certificated securities to the defendants. 72 
Publicly traded corporations almost universally issue certificated 
securities. 73 In the case of such corporations, few shareholders 
choose to hold certificates, though they have the right to do so. 74 
Rather, publicly held corporations issue a "jumbo certificate" that is 
held in New York by the Depository Trust Company (DTC). 75 In its 
computerized records, the DTC allocates pro rata interests to 
brokers, who allocate pro rata interests of its customers.76 Although 
investors think they own stock, in fact they are typically many 
times removed from the certificated securities issued by the 
corporation.77 What investors in securities listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange typically own are "security entitlements" as defined 
in Part 5 of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).78 
Closely held corporations often issue certificates, which are 
indeed physically held by the shareholder or some bailee of the 
shareholder.79 For example, in the recent case of Koehler v. Bank of 
70 See Doubet, LLC v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3235, at *35 (Sup. 
Ct., New York County July 6, 2011). 
n See id. at *37-38. 
72 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
73 No More Paper: Information for Public Companies, DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING 
CORP., http://www.dtcc.com/leadership/issues/nomorepaper/companies (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013). 
14 See U.C.C. § 8-508 cmt. 1 (2005). 
75 Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 598-99 (1990). 
76 Id. at 599. 
11 Id. at 599-600, 603. 
78 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(l 7) (2001). 
79 See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the 
Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 501-02 (1993) (outlining shareholder securities 
under federal law). 
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Bermuda Ltd.,80 a Maryland defendant pledged actual certificates to 
the Bank of Bermuda in exchange for a loan.81 The shares were 
physically held in Bermuda.82 The plaintiff succeeded in obtaining 
a federal judgment in Maryland, which was domesticated in New 
York federal court.83 The New York Court of Appeals-responding 
to a certified question from the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit-ruled that, since the Bank of Bermuda did business in New 
York, a New York court would have personal jurisdiction over the 
bank and therefore could compel the bank to fetch the certificates 
back from Bermuda, where a federal marshal could sell them.84 
Koehler is an interesting case on its own. 85 We may expect, for 
example, that airlines doing business in New York may be 
compelled to remove the luggage of defendants from flights 
anywhere in the world, so that the New York sheriff may hold it for 
eventual sale.86 Be that as it may, for our much narrower purpose, 
in Koehler at least the garnishee bank was qualified to do business 
in New York, and so the court clearly had personal jurisdiction over 
the bank.87 In Falor, the twenty-three garnishees were not present 
in New York, and yet the court imposed jurisdiction over them 
nevertheless. 88 
A. Levying on Uncertificated Equity Interests 
Where certificates exist, the sheriff can levy them and sell them.89 
8° Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, .911 N.E.2d 825, 883 N.Y.S.2d 763 
(2009). 
81 Id. at 536, 911 N.E.2d at 827, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 765. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 537, 541, 911 N.E.2d at 828, 831, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 766, 769. 
85 See Michael A. McGarry Jr., Note, Vestiges of Jurisdiction: On the In Rem Nature of Pre-
Judgment Attachment in New York, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1581, 1592-93 (2010); Damien H: 
Weinstein, Comment, New York: The Next Mecca for Judgment Creditors? An Analysis of 
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3161, 3163 (2010). 
86 In the context of pre-judgment attachment, only the luggage of those defendants with 
minimum contacts with New York may be removed by the garnished airline. See supra note 
25 and accompanying text. 
87 Koehler, 12 N.Y.3d at 540, 911 N.E.2d at 830, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 768. Koehler involved 
certificated shares of stock. A rather different issue is where a creditor could garnish a bank 
account where the bank is doing business in New York, but the bank account is maintained at 
a branch outside New York. This entails an ancient doctrine according to which every bank 
branch is a separate entity for purposes of garnishment. The doctrine may or may not still 
endure. See Geoffrey Sant, The Rejection of the Separate Entity Rule Validates the Separate 
Entity Rule, 65 S.M.U.L REV. 813 (2012). 
88 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 314, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1209, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 705 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
89 See generally David Gray Carlson & Carlton M. Smith, New York Tax Warrants: In the 
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In Falor, however, there were no certificates. 90 In such a case, how 
should the sheriff proceed? 
Falor involved a New York levy of a prejudgment order of 
attachment.91 According to CPLR section 6202, "[a]ny debt or 
property against which a money judgment may .be enforced as 
provided in section 5201 is subject to attachment."92 Section 5201 in 
turn distinguishes between debts and property.93 Debts are 
statutorily defined as "any debt, which is past due or which is yet to 
become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, 
whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a 
resident or non-resident."94 An LLC owes no debt to its members.95 
If it authorizes a dividend, however, its obligation to pay the 
dividend would constitute a debt.96 But no corporation (and, by 
analogy, no limited liability company) has a contractual obligation 
to issue dividends.97 So equity shares, whether certificated or not, 
are not typically debts, in the New York sense. Rather, equity 
interests are "any property which could be assigned or transferred, 
whether it consists of a present or future right or interest and 
whether or not it is vested."98 
CPLR section 5201 goes on to provide different rules for 
certificated and uncertificated shares of stock.99 According to the 
CPLR, "[w]here property ... is evidenced by ... a certificate of stock 
of an association or corporation ... the person holding it shall be the 
garnishee."100 In the case of uncertificated securities, CPLR section 
5201(c)(l) provides: 
Where property consists of a right or share in the stock of an 
association or corporation, or interests or profits therein, for 
Strange World of Deemed Judgments, 75 ALB. L. REV. 671, 694-95 (2012) (discussing sheriff 
levy powers created by court documents and warrants). See Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 314, 926 
N.E.2d at 1209, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 705. 
9° Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
91 Id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01. 
92 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6202 (McKinney 2013). 
93 Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a) (McKinney 2013), with C.P.L.R. 5201(b). 
94 C.P.L.R. 5201(a). 
95 See Joshua Slocum, Ltd. v. Boyle, 103 B.R. 610, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). 
96 Id. at 615. 
97 Fifth Third Bank v. United States, 518 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
98 C.P.L.R. 5201(b). In the post-judgment context, "property" is divided into property (ii) 
capable or (iii) not capable of delivery, a distinction not utilized in Article 62. See N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 5202(a), 5232 (McKinney 2013). 
99 Compare C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(l), with C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(4). 
100 C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(4). Delaware has a different situs rule. Even if.certificates are 
outstanding, the situs of shares is in Delaware. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 192 (1977) 
(construing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975)). 
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which a certificate of stock ... is not outstanding, the 
corporation, or the president or treasurer of the association 
on behalf of the association, shall be the garnishee. 101 
It was under this statute that the sheriff garnished Mitchell. 102 
Section 5201(c) is unfortunately worded. In Falor, Mitchell was 
president of twenty-three garnishees that had issued uncertificated 
membership interests which would presumably fall within the 
meaning of the term "shares of stock."103 According to section 
5201(c)(l), Mitchell is the garnishee. 104 Properly, Mitchell is not the 
garnishee. He is the agent of twenty-three different garnishees.105 
Mitchell is not the garnishee because Mitchell does not owe the 
defendants any debt, nor does he have custody of their property. 106 
The LLCs, not Mitchell, issued uncertificated securities to the 
defendants. 107 What section 5201(c)(l) should have said is that a 
company issuing uncertificated securities is effectively .garnished 
when the president or treasurer as agent of the company is served 
with the order of attachment. 
B. Article 8 
The phrase "uncertificated securities" implies that Article 8 of the 
UCC applies. According to UCC section 8-103, "[a] share or similar 
equity interest issued by a corporation ... is a security."108 One of 
the garnishees in Falor was not an LLC but was a Florida 
corporation that has issued uncertificated securities. 109 As to this 
one garnishee, UCC section 8-112(b) provides: "[t]he interest of a 
debtor in an uncertificated security may be reached by a creditor 
only by legal process upon the issuer at its chief executive office in the 
United States, except as otherwise provided in subsection (d)."110 
With regard to this one garnishee, the plaintiff was obligated to 
101 C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(l). 
102 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
103 Id. 
104 See C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(l) . 
105 See Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
106 The CPLR requires a garnishee to be "a person who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, 
or a person other than the judgment debtor who has property in his possession or custody in 
which a judgment debtor has an interest." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(i) (McKinney 2013). 
101 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
10s U.C.C. § 8-103(a) (2012). 
109 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 309, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
no U.C.C. § 8-112(b) (2012) (emphasis added). Again, subsection (d) gives advice only as to 
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travel to Florida and use Florida process only. 111 In upholding the 
order of attachment, the Falor court seems to have ignored section 
8-112(b) entirely. 112 Properly, section 8-112(b) should have 
compelled the supreme court to deny the Falor plaintiff an order of 
attachment with regard to the Florida corporation. The plaintiffs 
remedy was limited to obtaining Florida legal process. 113 
C. LLC Interests 
It is not clear, however, that this provision applied to the twenty-
two LLC garnishees in Falor. The Falor court refers to the 
defendants' "uncertificated ownership interests."114 UCC section 8-
112(b) applies to securities. According to section 8-103(c), "[a]n 
interest in a ... limited liability company is not a security unless it 
is dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in securities 
markets, its terms expressly provide that it is a security governed by 
this Article, or it is an investment company security."115 That is, the 
status of membership interests in LLCs as uncertificated securities 
is elective. The Falor court never says that the defendants' equity 
interests in the LLCs are uncertificated securities. 116 If they were, 
the order of attachment was quite illegitimate, in light of section 8-
112(b).117 We will assume, as the Falor court did sub silentio, that 
Article 8 does not apply to the LLC garnishees. 
In Falor, Mitchell, as owner of the LLCs, was the proper 
garnishee, 118 and delivery of the order of attachment to him 
supposedly constituted a levy.119 What precisely is a levy? 
1. Levie13 in New York 
A levy is what section 6214(b) says it is-no more, no less. 
According to the third sentence of CPLR section 6214(b): 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the person served with 
111 See U.C.C. § 8-112(b). 
112 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
113 See U.C.C. § 8-112(b). 
114 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 315-16, 926 N.E.2d at 1210, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 706; see also id. at 14 
N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701 ("[D]efendants' 
ownership/membership interests are intangible and uncertificated."). 
115 U.C.C. § 8-103(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
116 See Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (emphasis added) 
(describing ownership/membership rights as uncertificated, but not equity interests). 
m See U.C.C. § 8-112(b). 
118 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308-09, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 






transfer or d 
This sentencE 
garnishee shou] 
the debt is exti1 
twice.121 But VI 
garnishee is to 
can this mean ii 
2. Charging Or 
In Delaware, 
located, LLC i1 
articles of orgar 
This languag 
clarifies that ar 
to participate i 
limited liabilit: 
organization or 
approval of oth 
conditions in 
authorizing pre 
can not transf E 
right "to shai 
distribution or 
income, gain, 1( 
assignor was ei 
Therefore, in 
the outright sa 
sale is permit 
debtor and doe 
120 N.Y. C.P.L.R. ( 
121 N.Y. C.P.L.R. I 
122 N.Y. C.P.L.R. i 
123 FLA. STAT. § 61 
702(a) (2005); GA. C< 
124 FLA. STAT.§ 6 
702(a) (2005); GA. C< 
125 FLA. STAT. § ( 
18-702(b)(2) (2005); I 
[Vol. 76.2 
:n upholding the 
1 ignored section 
>) should have 
intiff an order of 
. The plaintiffs 
ss. na 
id to the twenty-
·t refers to the 
UCC section 8-
1 8-103(c), "[a]n 
.ecurity unless it 
or in securities 
~rity governed by 
."115 That is, the 
'icated securities 
fendants' equity 
16 If they were, 
.ght of section 8-
:ub silentio, that 
;vas the proper 
chment to him 
Llevy? 
more, no less. 
4(b): 
served with 
706; see also id. at 14 
701 ("[D]efendants' 
701 (emphasis added) 
ity interests). 
701. 
2012/2013] Where Corporations Are 1155 
the order shall forthwith transfer or deliver all such 
property, and pay all such debts upon maturity, up to the 
amount specified in the order of attachment, to the sheriff 
and execute any document necessary to effect the payment, 
transfer or delivery.120 
This sentence, as applied to debts, is perfectly coherent. The 
garnishee should simply pay the sheriff. If the garnishee does so, 
the debt is extinguished, and the garnishee cannot be made to pay 
twice. 121 But with regard to property not capable of delivery, the 
garnishee is to "transfer all such property'' to the sheriff. 122 What 
can this mean in the case of an LLC? 
2. Charging Orders 
In Delaware, Georgia, and Florida, where the Falor LLCs were 
located, LLC · interests are assignable, "except as provided in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement."123 
This language is somewhat misleading, however. The statute 
clarifies that an "assignee of a member's interest shall have no right 
to participate in the management of the business and affairs of a 
limited liability company except as provided in the articles of 
organization or operating agreement" and then only upon either the 
approval of other members of the LLC or the satisfaction of other 
conditions in the agreement.124 In other words, without an 
authorizing provision in the operable LLG agreement, a member 
can not transfer the full ownership of her LLC interest, only her 
right "to share in such profits and losses, to receive such 
distribution or distributions, and to receive such allocation of 
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit or similar item to which the 
assignor was entitled, to the extent assigned."125 
Therefore, in Falor, it is possible the garnishment cannot result in 
the outright sale of the defendants' equity interests. Or, even if a 
sale is permitted, management power remains in the member-
debtor and does not pass to the buyer, who simply obtains the right 
120 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2013). 
121 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6204 (McKinney 2013). 
122 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2013). 
123 FLA. STAT. § 608.432(1) (2007). For similar exceptions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
702(a) (2005); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-502(1) (2003). 
124 FLA. STAT. § 608.432(1) (2007). For similar provisions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
702(a) (2005); GA. CODE ANN.§§ 14-11-502(3), 14-11-505 (2003). 
125 FLA. STAT. § 608.432(2)(b) (2007). For similar provisions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 
18-702(b)(2) (2005); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-502(2) (2003). 
!I 
I 
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to dividends, if the entity ever chooses to issue them. 126 
Even where the operating agreement makes membership 
interests unassignable, it is still possible for judgment creditors to 
obtain charging orders.127 A charging order-"historically ; . . an 
obscure remedy''-requires the LLC to pay cash distributions (if 
any) to the judgment creditors who received the charging order. 128 
Accordingly, "the charging order is a weak remedy when the LLC 
does not generate revenues for distributions or when the LLC's 
management determines not to make distributions."129 
In Delaware, the charging order is the exclusive creditor 
remedy. 130 Georgia law makes the charging order non-exclusive, 
but it also states that a creditor may not "seek an order of the court 
requiring a foreclosure sale of the [LLC] interest."131 Since a 
foreclosure sale is the pro-creditor alternative to a charging order, 
Georgia law in effect does not differ from Delaware law. 132 
Florida law is more complex. As of May 31, 2011, the relevant 
statutory authority provides: 
(a) On application, to a court of competent jurisdiction by 
any judgment creditor of a member or a member's assignee, 
the court may enter a charging order against the limited 
liability company interest of the judgment debtor or assignee 
rights for the unsatisfied amount of the judgment plus 
interest. 
(b) A charging order constitutes a lien on the judgment 
debtor's limited liability company interest or assignee rights. 
Under a charging order, the judgment creditor has only the 
rights of an assignee of a limited liability company interest 
to receive any distribution or distributions to which the 
judgment debtor would otherwise have been entitled from 
the limited liability company, to the extent of the judgment, 
including interest. 133 In the case of a limited liability 
company having more than one member, the remedy of 
126 Bishop, supra note 23, at 16 (explaining the buyer is not a member unless the other 
members agree). 
127 J. William Callison, Charging Order Exclusivity: A Pragmatic Approach to Olmstead v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 66 Bus. LAW. 339, 355 (2011). 
128 Id. at 341-42. The charging order was introduced by the Uniform Partnership Act of 
1914. Id. at 341. 
129 Id. at 340. 
130 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(d). 
131 GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-504(b) (Supp. 2012). 
132 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(d), with GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-504(b). 
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foreclosure on a judgment debtor's interest in such limited 
liability company or against rights to distribution from such 
limited liability company is not available to a judgment 
creditor attempting to satisfy the judgment and may not be 
ordered by a court. 
Florida's LLC law goes on to make the charging order the 
exclusive remedy for LLCs with more than one member. 134 With 
regard to single member LLCs, upon a showing "that distributions 
under a charging order will not satisfy the judgment within a 
reasonable time," a sale of the member's interest can be ordered. 135 
However: 
In the case of a limited liability company having more than 
one member, the remedy of foreclosure on a judgment 
debtor's interest in such limited liability company or against 
rights to distribution from such limited liability company is 
not available to a judgment creditor attempting to satisfy the 
judgment and may not be ordered by a court. 136 
Florida's recent amendment overrules Olmstead v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 137 where the Florida Supreme Court held that the 
charging order was not the exclusive remedy, given the statute in 
effect in 2010. 138 Non-exclusivity, however, is thought to interfere 
with Florida's "pick-your-partner" policy-the policy that non-debtor 
LLC members cannot be made to share management with a 
stranger who has bought the encumbered membership interest at a 
foreclosure sale. 139 Perhaps for this reason Florida chose to amend 
its LLC law. 
3. New York Levies as Charging Orders Abroad 
In Falor, only the Florida memberships were foreclosable, 
assuming the 2011 amendment is not retrospective in application.140 
In the other states, the most that could be achieved is a charging 
order.141 
There is a conflict between the law of New York, on the one hand, 
134 Id. § 608.433(5). 
135 Id. § 608.433(6). 
136 Id. § 608.433(8). 
137 Olmstead v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 44 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2010). 
138 Id. at 81-82. 
139 Callison, supra note 127, at 350-51. 
140 See FLA. STAT.§ 608.433(4)(a). 
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and the law of Delaware, Georgia, and (as of May 31, 2011,) Florida, 
on the other.142 The third sentence of New York CPLR section 
6214(b) provides "the person served with the order shall forthwith 
transfer or deliver all such property . . . to the sheriff and execute 
any document necessary to effect the ... transfer or delivery."143 
The law of the other states directly countermands this language and 
limits any "judgment creditor" to a charging order.144 
Two issues arise, however. The first is whether a New York order 
of attachment would be recognized in the other states as a "charging 
order."145 The matter is clear in Georgia that the New York 
attachment would be upheld, whether it constitutes a charging 
order or not. 146 According to Georgia Code section 14-11-504(b): 
The [ charging order] remedy . . . shall not be deemed· 
exclusive of others which may exist, including, without 
limitation, the right of a judgment creditor to reach the 
limited liability company interest of the member by process 
of garnishment served on the limited liability company, 
provided that, except as otherwise provided in the articles of 
organization or a written operating agreement, a judgment 
creditor shall have no right under this chapter or any other 
state law to interfere with the management of force 
dissolution of a limited liability company or to seek an order 
of the court requiring a foreclosure sale of the limited 
liability company interest.147 
This section and the comparable statutes from Delaware and 
Florida refer to "judgment creditors," not to plaintiffs seeking pre-
judgment attachment.148 We presume that the phrase "judgment 
creditors" would be interpreted by courts to include plaintiffs, who 
aspire to become judgment creditors and who, in the meantime, 
seek prejudgment attachment. 
142 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703, FLA. STAT. § 608.433, and GA. CODE ANN. § 
14-11-504, with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214 (McKinney 2013). 
143 C.P.L.R. 6214(b). 
144 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-504(a); FLA. STAT. § 
608.433(4)(b). All three statutes refer to judgment creditors, rather than plaintiffs who do not 
yet have judgments. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(a); FLA. STAT. § 608.433(4)(b); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-11-504(a). Presumably, the courts of these states would extend the 
exclusivity rule to prejudgment attachment, though the matter is not absolutely certain. 
145 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703; FLA. STAT. § 608.433 (failing by both statutes to state 
whether the remedy provided is exclusive of all other jurisdictions). 
146 GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-504(b). 
147 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Georgia Code section 14-11-504(b) clearly indicates that court 
orders that are not styled "charging orders" will nevertheless be 
competent to oblige the LLC to pay actually voted to the sheriff all 
dividends that it may choose to authorize. 149 This is less clear in 
Delaware or Florida. Given that the charging order requirement is 
based on vindicating the "pick-your-partner" principle, courts in 
these states would be well justified in upholding the New York 
order of attachment as charging orders encumbering the 
defendants' right to receive dividends actually authorized by the 
LLC.150 The precise statutory language that justifies this conclusion 
comes from the second and third sentences of section 6214(b): 
[A]ll debts of [the defendant], including any specified in the 
notice, then due and thereafter coming due to the defendant, 
shall be subject to the levy. Unless the court orders 
otherwise, the person served with the order shall forthwith . 
. . pay all such debts upon maturity, up to the amount 
specified in the order of attachment, to the sheriff .... 151 
4. Full Faith and Credit 
Assuming that the order of attachment qualifies as a charging 
order under the law of Delaware and Florida, a second issue is 
posed. New York law commands the garnishee to transfer the 
shares in their entirety to the sheriff. 152 The laws of Delaware, 
Georgia, and Florida prohibit this remedy. 153 Given that New York 
(supposedly) has obtained jurisdiction over the person of the LLCs, 
is New York's order of attachment entitled to full faith and credit in 
these other states? 
Here the answer seems to be no, under the "the enforcement 
exception" to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 154 A governing 
precedent on this exception is Baker v. General Motors Corp., where 
a Michigan court issued an injunction against a former employee of 
a defendant from giving testimony against the defendant. 155 The 
149 See GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-ll-504(b). 
150 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2013). 
151 C.P.L.R. 6214(b). 
152 C.P.L.R. 6214(c). 
153 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(a); FLA. STAT.§ 608.433(4)(a); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-
ll-504(b). 
154 See Baker v. Gen. Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (citations omitted) ("Enforcement 
measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures 
remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law."). 
165 Id. at 226. 
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employee was subpoenaed in Missouri, which refused to give full 
faith and credit to the Michigan injunction. 156 
Since the New York order of attachment is basically "injunctive in 
nature,"157 Baker establishes that Delaware, Georgia, and Florida 
need not give full faith and credit to the New York remedy of 
attachment, though they would be obligated to provide some 
remedy, assuming that New York had proper jurisdiction over the 
LLCs. 158 And, of course, a local charging order would be a remedy, 
though one that is less adequate than what New York would 
supply.159 
5. Summary 
To summarize, the meaning of the order of attachment in Falor 
(in its pre-judgment life) was that, in Delaware and Georgia, if all 
went well, the plaintiff would have charging orders against the 
twenty-three LLC garnishees-a rather second-rate remedy.160 In 
Florida, provided the 2011 amendment to the LLC law is 
prospective only, the order of attachment could have effectuated a 
foreclosure of all the defendants' membership interests. 161 But all 
this presumes that the New York court had personal jurisdiction 
over the LLCs.162 
IV. GARNISHEES AND DEFENDANTS 
The key to the Falor case is the mode of the sheriffs levy. 
According to CPLR section 6214(a), "[t]he sheriff shall levy upon 
any interest of the defendant in personal property ... by serving a 
copy of the order of attachment upon the garnishee, or upon the 
defendant if property to be levied upon is in the defendant's 
possession or custody."163 To be noted is that the sheriff must 
personally serve a garnishee or a defendant. 164 Furthermore, the 
order of attachment must "direct the sheriff to levy· within his 
156 Id. at 230. 
167 McGarry, supra note 85, at 1582. 
158 Baker, 522 U.S. at 235-36. 
169 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.433(4)(b) (2012). 
160 See Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 
900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
161 See FLA. STAT.§ 608.433(4). 
162 Id. § 608.433(4)(a) ("On application to a court of competent jurisdiction . ... " (emphasis 
added)). 
163 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2013). 
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jurisdiction."165 This is one of the very few times that the CPLR 
makes explicit · that the sheriff is indeed limited to his 
"jurisdiction,"166 which presumably means the county of the 
supreme court for which the sheriff serves. 
We must also register another important conceptual point. 
"Garnishee" is a term expressly defined by the CPLR section 105(i) 
as "a person other than the judgment debtor who has property in his 
possession or custody in which a judgment debtor has an 
interest."167 Section 105(i) establishes "garnishee" and "judgment 
debtor" are mutually exclusive categories. One cannot be both a 
judgment debtor and a garnishee at the same time. 168 The CPLR 
invokes the law of the excluded middle. 
Falor, however, is a prejudgment attachment case. At the time of 
the order of attachment, there were no judgment debtors yet. 169 
There were only defendants who would indeed become judgment 
debtors in the future. 17° CPLR section 6202, however, makes clear 
that "for the purpose of applying the provisions to attachment, 
references to a 'judgment debtor' in section 5201 and in subdivision 
(i) of section shall be construed to mean 'defendant."'171 Accordingly, 
in attachment cases, the legislature intended to draw a mutually 
exclusive distinction between garnishees and defendants. 172 
We come now to the heart of darkness that blinde·d the Falor 
court. Mitchell was a defendant. 173 As a defendant, he had agreed 
in the guaranty contract to submit to a New York forum. 174 As a 
defendant, Mitchell was subject to levy by the sheriff of property "in 
the defendant's possession or custody."175 
In addition, Mitchell was the garnishee (or, to be more accurate, 
the agent of twenty-three different garnishees).176 As "garnishee," 
he could not be a defendant, given the definition (as we have 
interpreted it) in CPLR section 105(i).177 
165 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 62ll(a) (McKinney 2013). 
166 Carlson, supra note 53, at 79-80. 
167 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(i) (McKinney 2013) (emphasis added). 
168 See Michelsen v. Brush, 233 F. Supp. 868, 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
169 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 307-08, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1204-05, 
900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700-01 (2010), rev'.g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 
2008). 
170 See id. 
171 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6202 (McKinney 2013). 
172 See C.P.L.R. 6202. 
173 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
174 Id. 
175 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2013). 
176 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
177 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(i) (McKinney 2013). 
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Could Mitchell be both? It is possible to develop a theory whereby 
Mitchell the fiduciary is a person separate and apart from Mitchell 
the private citizen. If so, Mitchell the fiduciary has a duty to the 
court to assure that the LLC garnishees pay all distributions to the 
sheriff. Such a theory imposes a split personality on Mitchell. This 
theory would naturally follow, if CPLR section 5201(c)(l) had 
referred to the president of an LLC as an agent of a garnishee. 
Then clearly Mitchell as agent is different from Mitchell as 
defendant. 
Even if our Jekyll-and-Hyde theory is rejected, we may still 
observe that Mitchell was served with the order of attachment as 
garnishee for the other defendants (but not for himself) .178 He was 
also served as a defendant on the theory that Mitchell was in 
possession or custody of his own property.119 
V. MITCHELL AS "POSSESSOR OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY" 
Mitchell, then, wore twenty-four hats. He was a fiduciary for 
twenty-three garnishees, and he wore one hat as a defendant 
supposedly in possession of his own personal property. In this 
section, we examine the private hat of Mitchell as a defendant 
allegedly in possession of his own property. 
The Falor court ruled that the garnishment of Mitchell as private 
citizen and as garnishee was valid. 180 According to the court: 
a court with personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary 
present in New York has jurisdiction over that individual's 
tangible or intangible property, even if the. situs of the 
property is outside New York. Because personal jurisdiction 
was properly asserted over ... Mitchell, Supreme Court had 
the authority to order pre-judgment attachment of the 
property defendant Mitchell owned and/ or controlled, and 
service of the order upon him while he was in New York was 
appropriate.181 
Notice, in this passage, that the court blurs private Mitchell with 
fiduciary Mitchell. As a private citizen, Mitchell "owned" his own 
equity interests in the twenty-three garnishees.182 As a fiduciary 
178 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
179 See id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
180 . Id. at 314-15, 318, 926 N.E.2d at 1210, 1212, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 705-06, 708 (citing 
Hams v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1905)). 
181 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 312, 926 N.E.2d at 1208, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (emphasis added). 
182 Id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
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agent of the twenty-two LLCs, he "controlled" the distribution of 
dividends issued by the LLCs.183 In addition, if we buy into the 
schizophrenic solution suggested earlier,184 Mitchell was the proper 
garnishee for himself and could transfer his own equity interests 
over to the sheriff. 185 But we. put aside fiduciary Mitchell, for the 
moment, and consider only the private Mitchell. 
We have seen that a sheriff may levy property directly from a 
"defendant if property to be levied upon is in the defendant's 
possession or custody."186 So without question, the sheriffs delivery 
of the order of attachment was a levy of at least Mitchell's own 
equity interests in the LLCs-i/ and only if Mitchell was in 
possession or custody of them. "Custody" is not a defined term. We 
may define it, however, as "control."187 
One of the odd lapses in the CPLR is that it does not define what 
a levy from a defendant is. To be sure, in eight long and complex 
sentences, we learn about what a levy is for a garnishee. 188 But 
none of these rules apply to a non-garnishee. There are simply no 
rules at all for levying directly from a defendant. 189 In one respect, 
there is a positive aspect to this for the plaintiff. A levy of .a 
garnishee lasts for only ninety days, unless some further action is 
taken.190 This ninety-day rule does not expressly apply to 
defendants. 191 
So then, what must private Mitchell do by virtue of having 
received the order of attachment? Private Mitchell has no access to 
the books of the LLCs. Only fiduciary Mitchell does. By way of 
comparison, suppose Robert Falor, one of Mitchell's codefendants, 
had been in the courtroom instead of Mitchell, and suppose the 
sheriff delivered the order of attachment to Falor. Suppose further 
that Falor had no direct or indirect power to write checks on behalf 
of the LLCs. On this assumption, there was nothing that Falor 
could have done to effectuate the payment of a distribution. Service 
183 See id. 
184 See supra text accompanying note 40. 
185 . Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308-09, 926 N.E.2d 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
186 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2013). 
187 See S. Carbon Co. v. State, 171 Misc. 566, 568, 13 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (Ct. Cl. 1939), aff'd, 258 
A.D. 1004, 16 N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1940) (noting that the word "custody" "carries 
with it the idea of the thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the 
person to whose custody it is subjected"). 
188 C.P.L.R. 6214(b). 
189 Id. 
190 C.P.L.R. 6214(e). 
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on Falor would have been a useless act. To be sure, if Falor were 
enjoined to do something, he could be held in contempt for not doing 
it. But where in the CPLR is any non-garnishee defendant enjoined 
to do anything? 
Falor undoubtedly has rights against the LLCs if they do elect to 
issue dividends. In such a case the LLCs would be what Article 9 of 
the UCC calls "account debtors."192 Suppose Falor receives a 
dividend. Must he hand it over to the sheriff? Or, if the LLC 
refuses to pay Falor, must Falor bring suit against the LLC in order 
to obtain the funds, which then could be handed to the sheriff? 
Nothing in the CPLR expressly requires Falor to do this. 193 
Suppose Falor refuses to hand over the dividend. In the case of a 
garnishee, the CPLR is clear that the sheriff will not lift a finger to 
enforce the order of attachment.194 Rather, the plaintiff is expected 
to bring a turnover proceeding against the garnishee. 195 If the 
action is actually commenced, the levy of a garnishee extends 
beyond its ordinary ninety-day life. 196 But the CPLR does not seem 
to authorize a turnover action against defendants. According to 
CPLR section 6214(d): "Where property ... ha[s] been levied upon 
by service of an order of attachment, the plaintiff may commence a 
special proceeding against the garnishee served with the order to 
compel the payment, delivery or transfer to the sheriff of such 
property .... "197 Ex hypothesi, Falor is not a garnishee but rather 
is a defendant. So such a proceeding does not seem to be 
authorized. In comparison, the CPLR in the post-judgment context 
does permit turnover proceedings directly against judgment 
debtors. 198 
Of course, it was Mitchell, not Falor, who was served. 199 Mitchell 
as president could no doubt cause the LLCs to pay, but private 
Mitchell could not do this. The Falor court, however, ruled that 
192 N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-102(a)(3) (McKinney 2013) ("'Account debtor' means a person 
obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible."). 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 186-87 (detailing the lack of rules for levying from a 
defendant). 
194 See Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[H]aving served 
the levy and demanded possession, the sheriff had, in a sense, done all he was ordered or 
entitled to do under the warrant of attachment. It was up to [the plaintiff] to seek to compel 
the garnishee to turn over the assets." (citations omitted)). 
195 C.P.L.R. 6214(d). 
196 See C.P.L.R. 6214(e). 
191 C.P.L.R. 6214(d). 
198 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(a) (McKinney 2013). 
199 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 309, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
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private Mitchell had possession of his own equity interests. 200 On 
the basis of "possession," the levy of private Mitchell could go 
forward. 201 Can one "possess" intangible property? 
The Second Circuit, in Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo 
Mexicano De Desarrollo S.A., 202 "Erie-guessed" that the answer is 
yes.203 In Grupo Mexicano, a judgment creditor sought an order 
directing the judgment debtor to transfer a receivable owed by the 
Mexican government to the sheriff. 204 A turnover order pursuant to 
CPLR section 5225(a) against a judgment debtor is appropriate only 
if "the judgment debtor is in possession or custody of money or other 
personal property."205 Ultimately, the case was remanded to 
determine whether the receivable "could be assigned or 
transferred"206 within the meaning of CPLR section 5201(b). 207 
Nevertheless the Grupo Mexicano court also announced that it 
would "decline the invitation to hold that an asset characterized as 
property for the purposes of§ 5201 is necessarily characterizable as 
property for purposes of§§ 5225 and 5227 as well."208 Rather, the 
court ruled: "A judgment creditor seeking a turnover order therefore 
must show: First, that the asset it seeks to collect has been made 
available to judgment creditors by § 5201; and second, that the party 
against which the creditor has chosen to proceed has the ability to 
produce the asset."209 
This second requirement seems merely to be a restatement of 
section 5225(a)'s requirement that "the judgment debtor [be] in 
possession or custody of money or other personal property."210 And 
so the Grupo Mexicano court seemed to believe that intangible 
property is capable of possession.211 On such a view, possession 
means the legal ability to exclude others, not manucaption of 
something tangible. 212 This is a definition with which philosophers 
200 See id. at 312, 926 N.E.2d at 1207-08, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04. 
201 Id. at 312, 926 N.E.2d at 1208, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 704. 
202 Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 190 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
203 Id. at 25 n.9. The Falor case cites Grupo Mexicano favorably, but for a different 
proposition than what the text describes. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 313, 926 N.E.2d at 1209, 900 
N.Y.S.2d at 705. 
204 Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 19; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(a) (McKinney 2013). 
20s C.P.L.R. 5225(a). 
20s N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201 (McKinney 2013). · 
207 Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 26. 
208 Id. at 25. 
209 Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
210 C.P.L.R. 5225(a). 
211 See Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 25 n.9. 
212 See id. 
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are most comfortable.213 
The Falor court confirms the accuracy of the Second Circuit's Erie 
guess.214 If indeed the Falor court viewed Mitchell as not the proper 
garnishee for his own interests in the LLCs, then it must have 
believed that "possession'' is a term that can apply to intangible 
property.215 And indeed the Falor court refers to the "defendants' 
uncertificated ownership interests, which defendant Mitchell 
possesses or has custody over."216 
Here we see confusion afoot in the Falor opinion. Mitchell is said 
to possess or have custody over all the equity interests of all the 
defendants.217 But is the court thinking of private Mitchell or 
Mitchell the fiduciary? We will assume for the moment that the 
court has private Mitchell in mind. 
With regard to private Mitchell, the Falor court declares that 
Mitchell "possesses" his intangible property.218 In this regard the 
Falor court puts itself at odds with the United States Supreme 
Court in Harris v. Balk.219 • 
In this once-seminal case, sometimes thought to have been 
overruled, 220 Harris owed Balk and Balk owed Epstein. 221 Harris 
traveled from North Carolina to Maryland, where, on behalf of 
Epstein, a sheriff garnished Harris.222 Harris paid up and went 
home to North Carolina, where he was promptly sued by Balk, who 
had never been paid.223 Harris suggested that his payment of the 
Maryland sheriff constituted payment of Balk, but the North 
Carolina courts disagreed and passed judgment against Harris who 
thereby faced having to pay twice.224 Harris appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, which ruled that North Carolina was obliged 
213 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others."); see 
JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE F ASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND 
THE FEMININE 239-40 (1998) (discussing the philosophy of property issues, including 
possession). 
214 See Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 314, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1209, 
900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 705 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
215 See id. 
216 Id. at 315-16, 926 N.E.2d at 1210, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
211 Id. 
218 See id. at 314, 926 N.E.2d at 1209, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 705. 
219 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905). 
220 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980) (''We recently 
abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk .... "). 
221 Balk v. Harris, 30 S.E. 318, 318 (N.C. 1898). 
222 See id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 319. 
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to recognize the official acts of Maryland under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.225 Lucky Harris 
did not have to pay twice.226 
In so ruling, the Supreme Court observed, "[t]he obligation of the 
debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he 
goes."227 That is to say, the situs of Harris's obligation to pay is the 
situs of Harris himself. 228 Since Harris was in Maryland, so was the 
debt, and so Maryland had jurisdiction of the debt by virtue of 
having jurisdiction of Harris.229 As the Harris Court remarked: 
If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of 
the debt, then if the garnishee [Harris] be found in that 
State, and process be personally served upon him therein, we 
think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and 
can garnish [on behalf of Epstein] the debt due from [Harris] 
to the debtor of [Balk] and condemn it, provided the 
garnishee [Harris] could himself be sued by [Balk's] creditor 
in that State.230 
In Harris, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that debts have 
a location separate from the debtor. 231 Rather, wherever a debtor is, 
there too is his debt. This view was driven by the alleged 
impossibility of "possessing'' intangible property: "It is not a 
question of possession in the foreign State, for possession cannot be 
taken of a debt or of the obligation to pay it, as tangible property 
might be taken possession of."232 In short, the Harris Court denied 
that general intangibles could ever be "possessed."233 If that view 
were followed in New York, the Falor result would have come out 
quite differently. Serving Mitchell in New York would not succeed 
in attaching Mitchell's LLC interests. Rather, per Harris, the locus 
of the intangible property is where the garnishee is, which is to say 
not in New York, but rather in Delaware, Georgia, and Florida.234 
225 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226 (1905). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 222. 
22s Id. 
229 Id. at 226 ("[T]he judgment against Harris in Maryland, condemning the $180 which he 
owed to Balk, was a valid judgment, because the court had jurisdiction over the garnishee by 
personal service of process within the State of Maryland."). 
23o Id. at 222. 
231 Id. ("The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him 
wherever he goes."). 
232 Id. at 223. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 222; see Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308, 926 N.E.2d 
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Falor, then, contradicts Harris u. Balk. Ordinarily, it is mauuais 
gout for state courts to snub United States Supreme Court opinions. 
But was the Harris Court speaking constitutionally when it 
divorced possession from intangible property? In Harris, Maryland 
authorized the attachment of a debt by serving the order of 
attachment on the garnishee.235 This authorization, and the actual 
historic garnishment, was held to be within the power of the State 
of Maryland.236 For this reason, Maryland's garnishment was 
entitled to full faith and credit in North Carolina.237 The Supreme 
Court's comments on possession can, however, be understood as an 
interpretation of Maryland law. On this interpretation, Maryland 
itself defines "possession" in such a way that it cannot apply to 
intangible property. Given that definition, it was possible for 
Maryland to conflate the debt with the personhood of the garnishee, 
so that the sheriffs levy of the garnishee constituted control of the 
defendant's property. On this reading, Maryland was not 
constitutionally required to adopt such a rule of location. New York 
could-and did, prior to Falor-follow a different rule. 238 New York 
could constitutionally deem the situs of the debt as the garnishee's 
domicile,239 not where the garnishee physically happened to be.240 
To the extent that Mitchell was not a garnishee in Falor but 
rather a defendant in possession of his own intangible property, the 
Dep't 2008) ("The property at issue consisted of defendants' interests in 22 limited liability 
companies formed in Delaware, Georgia and Florida .... "). Of course, Harris involved debt. 
CPLR section 520l(a) defines "debt" as that "which is past due or which is yet to become due, 
certainly or upon demand .... " N.Y. C.P.L.R. 520l(a) (McKinney 2013). The LLCs did not 
owe Mitchell or the others "debt," on this definition. Rather, Mitchell and company owned 
membership interests in the garnishees. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that Harris reasoning 
applies to LLCs just as much as it applies to account debtors. But for the particular CPLR 
definition of debt, one could easily view the LLCs as contingent account debtors, pending an 
LLC decision to issue dividends. 
235 Harris, 198 U.S. at 226. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 221. 
238 Nat'l Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N.Y. 213, 223, 71 N.E. 766, 769 (1904), 
abrogated by Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698 ("The general rule is 
well settled that the situs of debts and obligations is at the domicile of the creditor."). 
239 Kennedy, supra note 69, at 702. 
240 See Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 174 
N.E. 299, 300 (1931). Oft quoted is Chief Justice Cardozo's dictum on situs of intangibles: 
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there are times when justice or 
convenience requires that a legal situs be ascribed to them. The locality selected is for 
some purposes, the domicile of the creditor; for others, the domicile or place of business 
of the debtor, the place, that is to say, where the obligation was created or was meant to 
be discharged; for others, any place where the debtor can be found. At the root of the 
selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and 
convenience in particular conditions. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Falor court disagreed with Maryland's definition of "possession" (as 
the Harris Court interpreted it). 241 In New York, one can possess 
intangible property, even though the garnishee is not present in 
New York.242 And this rule of location can be constitutionally 
legislated in New York, because Harris v. Balk did not 
constitutionalize the definition of "possession."243 If the Falor 
definition of "possession" had been operative in Maryland in 1896 
(the year of the fateful Harris garnishment), there never would 
have been a garnishment, because Maryland (and New York as of 
1905) would have located the garnishee's obligation in North 
Carolina. 
Ironically, the Falor court did not see itself as departing from 
Harris v. Balk.244 It thought it was actually following the case.245 
But in its reliance on Harris, the Falor court turned Harris on its 
head, much as Marx did to Hegel.246 Harris stands for the 
proposition that where the garnishee is, that's where his obligation 
is. 247 But, insofar as Mitchell (as private defendant) was served 
with the order of attachment, Mitchell was no garnishee. Rather, 
Mitchell was a creditor (after a fashion) of the garnishee.248 In 
effect, the Falor court applied the Harris v. Balk holding about 
garnishees to a defendant directly.249 In so doing, the Falor court 
was guilty of a serious category mistake. True, we may say that a 
defendant "possesses" his intangible property, and where Mitchell 
is, there is his property. This contradicts Harris v. Balk, to the 
extent the Harris Court held that possession of intangible property 
was an impossibility.250 In fact, Harris v. Balk stands against the 
Falor court, though the Falor court would have done well to ignore 
241 Compare Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 311, 926 N.E.2d at 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (finding that 
intangible property located in the state may be attached despite the possessor not being 
present in the state), with Harris, 198 U.S. at 222 (finding that intangible property may only 
be attached when the debtor is present in the state). 
242 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 311, 926 N.E.2d at 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
243 See generally Harris, 198 U.S. at 221-23 (failing to provide a definition of"possession"). 
244 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 315, 926 N.E.2d at 1210, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 706 ("[D]efendant 
Mitchell's status supports application of Harris to the case at bar."). 
245 Id. 
246 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 20 (Frederick Engels ed., 
Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., International Publishers 1967) (1867) ("With [Hegel] 
it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the 
rational kernel within the mystical shell."). 
247 Harris, 198 U.S. at 222. 
248 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. Actually, this would 
be literally true only if the garnishees elected to vote their interest holders a dividend. 
249 See id. at 311, 926 N.E.2d at 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (holding that attachment of 
intangible property within a state may be used to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant). 
250 See Harris, 198 U.S. at 223. 
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Harris as a pre-Erie guess about Maryland law which has no 
relevance to a case governed by New York law. 
The Falor court actually contradicts Harris v. Balk. Oddly, the 
Falor court used Harris to justify overruling its own precedent in 
National Broadway Bank v. Sampson.251 In National Broadway 
Bank, the defendant was a Massachusetts corporation.252 The 
garnishee was a Massachusetts partnership.253 Charles Sampson, a 
Massachusetts resident, was a partner in the garnishee and 
therefore was himself a garnishee, as partners are liable for all 
partnership debts. 254 Sampson was in New York casually when he 
was served with an order of attachment on behalf of the plaintiff. 255 
The court quashed the attachment because the situs of Sampson's 
obligation to the defendant was in Massachusetts, where Sampson 
lived.256 "If his debt had an actual situs," the National Broadway 
Bank court said, "it certainly was not migratory, and, therefore, as 
to him, it might not be attached in any state or jurisdiction where 
he might sojourn temporarily or in which one of his partners might 
reside."257 
In effect, the National Broadway Bank court disagreed with 
Harris v. Balk as to the situs of the payment intangible. Debts may 
migrate in and out of Maryland, but not in New York. New York is 
permitted to do this, as the Harris Court was not speaking ex 
cathedra when it confounded the situs of the garnishee's debt with 
the garnishee's person. In Harris, the situs was wherever the 
garnishee was.258 But in National Broadway Bank, the situs was 
where the garnishee was domiciled, not where the garnishee 
physically was.259 
The National Broadway Bank rule may in fact be a bad rule. In 
following it, the pre-Falor courts were giving up jurisdiction it could 
constitutionally assert over casual visitors. Under National 
251 See Nat'l Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N.Y. 213, 226, 71 N.E. 766, 769 (1904), 
abrogated by Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698. 
252 Id. at 219----20, 71 N.E. at 767. 
263 See id. 
254 See id. at 224, 71 N.E. at 769. 
256 Id. at 221, 71 N.E. at 768. 
256 Id. at 226, 71 N.E. 770. 
257 Id. at 225, 71 N.E. at 770. This domicile rule has been traced back to M'Queen v. 
Middletown Mfg Co. M'Queen v. Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5, 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); 
Kennedy, supra note 69, at 700. 
258 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905). 
259 Nat'l Broadway Bank, 179 N.Y. at 223, 71 N.E. at 767. Eugene H. Sampson was also a 
partner in the Massachusetts entity and also an account debtor. Id. at 219----20, 71 N.E. at 
767. But Eugene was domiciled in New York and therefore the order of attachment as to 
Eugene was upheld. Id. at 222, 71 N.E. at 768. 
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Broadway Bank, a garnishee could take in a Broadway show sans 
peur of garnishnient.260 Under Harris, the garnishee could be 
garnished.261 But the Falor court was wrong to think that National 
Broadway Bank is an unconstitutional rule. To the contrary, the 
National Broadway Bank rule is every bit as constitutional as the 
Harris rule. In this respect, the Falor court wrongly 
constitutionalized the Harris situs rule and used this false principle 
to overrule National Broadway Bank.262 
New York may temporarily have conformed to Harris v. Balk 
years ago-on nonconstitutional grounds. In Morris Plan Industrial 
Bank of New York v. Gunning, a sheriff levied a garnishee in New 
York for wages the garnishee owed defendant for work in 
Pennsylvania.263 The garnishee was a Pennsylvania domiciliary, 
having been incorporated there.264 The Court of Appeals, however, 
allowed the garnishment, even though the garnishment would have 
been forbidden under National Broadway Bank. 265 The Gunning 
court admitted that, prior to 1936, the situs of the wage debt was in 
Pennsylvania, where the garnishee was domiciled.266 That is, New 
York did not conform to Harris v. Balk.267 But 1936 saw the 
enactment of the following provision of the attachment statute: 
'Within the meaning of this section there shall be included any 
indebtedness due or to become due from a non-resident or foreign 
corporation, upon whom or which service of process may be made 
within this state, to any person whether a non-resident or foreign 
corporation."268 
Thus, in 1936 the New York legislature overruled National 
260 Id. at 224, 71 N.E. at 769. 
261 Harris, 198 U.S. at 222. 
262 See Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 316, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1211, 
900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 706-07 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 
2008) ('National Broadway Bank's restrictive view regarding the situs of intangible property, 
as evidenced by its holding that the debtor's domicile serves as the jurisdictional predicate to 
support an attachment, was overruled in Harris v. Balk, and should no longer be cited as 
authority for determining the situs of intangible property" (citing Morris Plan Indus. Bank of 
N.Y. v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 329-30, 67 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1946))). 
263 Gunning, 295 N.Y.at 327-28, 67 N.E.2d at 511. 
264 See id. 
265 Id. at 330, 67 N.E.2d at 512. 
266 Id. at 329, 67 N.E.2d at 512. 
267 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905); Gunning, 295 N.Y.2d at 329, 67 N.E.2d at 512. 
268 Gunning, 295 N.Y.2d at 329, 67 N.E.2d at 512 (quoting 1936 N.Y. Laws 1718). In 1940, 
this language was rewritten to state that attachment can reach any debt "to a resident or 
non-resident person or corporation, from a resident or non-resident person or corporation, 
upon whom or which service of process may be had within the county." Gunning, 295 N.Y. at 






1172 Albany Law Review [Vol. 76.2 
Broadway and opted for the Harris v. Balk rule.269 
The Falor court cites Gunning270 and immediately thereafter 
remarks, "[i]n any event, National Broadway Bank, which was 
decided over 50 years before the CPLR was enacted, is simply not 
consonant with CPLR article 62."271 This remark, however, is 
contradicted by yet another remark: "At the outset, we acknowledge 
that '[t]he CPLR contains no provision as to the situs of [intangible] 
property for attachment purposes."'272 
So the court hints at the subconstitutional repeal of National 
Broadway but never quite articulates it and instead relies on a bad 
constitutional reading of Harris v. Balk. Why did the Falor court 
not rely on Gunning's nonconstitutional holding? 
Perhaps, the CPLR in fact overrules Gunning. First, CPLR 
article sixty-two prohibits the prejudgment attachment of wages. 273 
Second, in the post-judgment context, the CPLR requires that an 
income execution be served on the sheriff of the county where the 
judgment debtor resides.274 Or, where the debtor is not a resident of 
the state, the judgment creditor must deliver the income execution 
to the sheriff of the county where the debtor is employed.275 Under 
the modern CPLR, wages earned in Pennsylvania by a 
Pennsylvania worker could never be garnished in New York. 
These points do not exactly go to the legislative intent in 1936 to 
overrule National Broadway Bank, but we must also observe that 
269 Gunning, 295 N.Y. at 330, 67 N.E.2d at 512. 
270 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 316, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1211, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 707 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
211 Id. 
272 Id. at 314, 926 N.E.2d at 1209, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (alteration in original) (quoting 
ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 675, 350 N.E.2d 899, 902, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1976)). 
273 See Gulf Int'! Bank B.S.C. v. Othman, No. 93 Civ. 3161 (CSH), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17508, at *6, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1993) (citing Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 244 
N.E.2d 259, 262, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (1968)) (emphasizing that this issue has been left 
open in the New York Court of Appeals). 
274 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(b) (McKinney 2013). 
275 Id. The effect of CPLR section 5231(b) is to immunize debtors who work outside the 
state for an employer who is present in New York. See id. In Brown v. Arabian American Oil 
Co., a judgment debtor worked in Saudi Arabia and AD was properly served by registered 
mail. Brown v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 53 Misc. 2d 182, 184, 278 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258-59 (Sup. 
Ct. Suffolk County 1967). Since the judgment debtor neither lived nor was employed in New 
York, the creditor could not comply with the above requirements. Id. at 183, 185, 278 
N.Y.S.2d at 257, 259. Accordingly, the levy was quashed. Id. at 185, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 259. 
See also Kaplan v. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co., 46 Misc. 2d 574, 575, 580, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374, 374, 
379 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965) (concluding a Minnesota corporation was not obligated to 
honor a New York income execution seeking to reach the wages of one of its employees, a 
resident of Massachusetts, where it was served at its New York office, but had its principal 
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the 1936 language cited in Gunning as overruling Harris v. Balk no 
longer appears in article sixty-two.276 This absence suggests that 
perhaps the legislature had reversed itself on this question. As the 
Falor court recognized, the CPLR has no rule on the situs of the 
debt. 277 Because of these difficulties, the Falor court evidently felt it 
could not push too hard on legislative intent. Better to rely on a bad 
interpretation of constitutional law! 
Still, the court might have borrowed a page from its recent 
opinion in Rondack Construction Services, Inc. v. Kaatsbaan 
International Dance Center, Inc. 278 In that case, a judgment debtor 
tendered a cashier's check to a sheriff preparing to sell the debtor's 
real estate pursuant to an execution sale.279 The sheriff refused to 
call off the sale,280 reasoning that the CPLR had repealed the 
concept of "redemption" with regard to execution sales.281 The 
Court of Appeals ruled that the CPLR was intended to repeal the 
concept of post-sale redemption,282 because such a right suppresses 
bidding at execution sales.283 "The enactment of CPLR 5236, 
however, did not alter a debtor's right to recover property before a 
judicial sale."284 The case arguably stands for the proposition that, 
unless the badly drafted CPLR expressly states otherwise, 
salubrious pre-CPLR practices continue to be the law in New York. 
On this basis, a nonconstitutional pre-CPLR overruling of National 
Broadway could have been upheld. 
In any case, the Broadway National Bank rule has little to 
recommend it. According to Professor Kennedy: 
It seems rather fantastic to hold to a fiction that a debt is 
lodged at the domicile of the debtor, when the fact is that he 
does not leave his obligations behind him .... 
276 See Morris Plan Indus. Bank of N.Y. v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 329-30, 67 N.E.2d 510, 
512 (1946). 
277 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 314, 926 N.E.2d at 1209, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 705. 
278 Rondack Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Kaatsbaan Int'l Dance Ctr., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 580, 923 
N.E.2d 561, 896 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2009). 
279 Id. at 583, 923 N.E.2d at 562, 896 N.Y.S.2d at 279. 
280 Id . 
281 See id. at 584, 923 N.E.2d at 562, 896 N.Y.S.2d at 279 (relying potentially on similar 
reasoning used by a sheriff in the case of Tiffany v. St. John, 65 N.Y. 314 (1875)). 
282 Rondack Constr. Servs., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d at 584, 923 N.E.2d at 562, 896 N.Y.S.2d at 279 
(citing Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 520, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d 
56, 59, 60 (1979)). 
283 Guardian, 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 60. 
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[I]t is submitted that New York should remove this 
remaining ''bit of archaic form" which links and restricts the 
garnishment of intangible debts to the domicile of creditor or 
debtor. This fiction is not demanded by the constitutional 
provisions of due process, nor is it imposed upon the courts 
by legislative mandate. Tested in the scales of justice-
which is the sole warrant for the continuance of its fictitious 
existence-it is arbitrary and unfair to plaintiffs, generally 
New York citizens or domestic corporations, and unduly 
mindful of the interests of non-resident defendants and 
garnishees. Tested in terms of the emergencies and 
tendencies of the time, this static idea of domicile as a sort of 
safe-deposit vault for intangible debts is a curious relic in the 
midst of the fluidity of modern business .... 285 
Repeal by the Falor court of the domicile rule may be a good 
thing. The domicile rule was judicially created, so it presumably 
could be judicially destroyed as well. 286 But repeal cannot be 
justified on the grounds of constitutional compulsion. 
None of this yet suggests that the Falor court acted 
unconstitutionally when it subjected Mitchell's interests in the 
LLCs to the order of attachment. New York could constitutionally 
declare that a defendant's intangible property is located where a 
defendant is. Still there is the further question of whether New 
York's holding is worthy of full faith and credit in other states. 
Suppose, prior to entry of a final judgment in New York, an agent of 
plaintiff were to travel to Florida to compel a garnishee domiciled 
there to honor the New York attachment lien.287 Must Florida give 
285 Kennedy, supra note 69, at 696, 703-04; see also id. at 699 ("[I]nsistent adherence to 
domicile as a jurisdictional test of garnishment is purely judicial in origin .... [I]t is hardly 
conceivable . . . that the legal fiction that a debt is only attachable or garnishable at the 
domicile of the debtor-garnishee can permanently endure."). 
286 See id. at 696, 697. 
287 In Falor, the trial court had appointed a receiver to take charge of the property 
encumbered by the attachment lien. Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 307, 
926 N.E.2d 1202, 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). This too is a rather surprising development. Article 62 (which 
governs orders of attachment) nowhere mentions receivers. CPLR section 5228 permits the 
appointment of a receiver when a judgment creditor so moves. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a) 
(McKinney 2013). But, prior to the entry of a money judgment, there is no "judgment 
creditor." The CPLR defines a judgment creditor as "a person in whose favor a money 
judgment is entered or a person who becomes entitled to enforce it." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(1) 
(McKinney 2013). Article 62 gives rights to plaintiffs, not to judgment creditors. 
Significantly, the supreme court order appointing the receiver was "conditioned upon the 
entry of judgment." Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 309, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 58 A.D.3d 
270, 273, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008), rev'd, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 
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full faith and credit to the New York proceedings? The answer 
would seem to be yes. Florida might adopt the Harris v. Balk 
location rule and hold that Mitchell's intangible rights are located in 
Florida, where the garnishee is. But New York constitutionally 
locates that same property where defendant is. 288 Each location 
rule is constitutional and therefore entitled to full faith and credit. 
So long as the New York courts act first, Florida must bow in awe 
and respect, under the principle of "first in time is first in right."289 
The matter might be different if the property were tangible. 
Suppose Mitchell's equity interests were represented by certificated 
securities, and these certificates were located in Florida. A Florida 
sheriff pursuant to a Florida execution against Mitchell might levy 
those shares in total disregard of the New York attachment lien. 
This is the implication of another ancient Supreme Court case, Fall 
v. Eastin,290 decided only four years after Harris v. Balk.291 In Fall, 
a Washington divorce court ordered a husband to convey Nebraska 
land to his wife. 292 When he refused, the Washington court issued a 
decree declaring the wife to be the owner of the Nebraska land.293 
Subsequently, the husband conveyed the Nebraska land to X.294 In 
Nebraska, the wife tried to quiet title against X, but the Nebraska 
court snubbed the Washington decree and held for X.295 On appeal, 
the United States Supreme Court upheld and thereby compounded 
the insult.296 
1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698). Presumably, this meant that the receiver had no power to do 
anything until the judgment was actually entered. See Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 309, 926 N.E.2d at 
1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
288 See Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 312, 926 N.E.2d at 1208, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 704. 
289 In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037, 1064-65 (9th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 63 
(2010), af/'d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, reh 'g denied, 132 S.Ct. 56 (2011) 
(110lding federal district court in California owed full faith and credit to a Texas probate court, 
because the probate court ruled first). 
29° Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the 
Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 889 
n.134 (1985) ("[l]n an obscure and turgid ... opinion, the Court over ... unexplained dissents 
... held that Nebraska need not respect a deed to Nebraska land executed by an officer of the 
state of Washington pursuant to a Washington decree respecting the division of the property 
of Washington spouses incident to a divorce."). Brainerd Currie writes the classic 
deconstruction. See Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 620, 621 (1954) [hereinafter Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land 
Degrees]. 
291 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
292 Fall, 215 U.S. at 14 . 
29a Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. at 4, 5, 14. 
296 Id. at 14. The matter would have been different if the wife had sought confirmation 
from a Nebraska court. In such a case, the Nebraska court would have been obliged to 
1176 Albany Law Review [Vol. 76.2 
Fall, by its terms, applies equally well to judicial liens on tangible 
personal property,297 though some seek to cabin it to real property 
only.298 Accordingly, if Mitchell's certificated shares were located in 
Florida, the Florida sheriff could levy the shares in question 
pursuant to a Florida judgment (where a creditor had a judgment 
against Mitchell). In short, Fall suggests a disjunction between 
liens on intangible property and liens on tangible property not 
located in New York. 299 
VI. AN LLC IS WHERE ITS PRESIDENT Is 
The past few pages have emphasized that, in Falor, the sheriff 
validly levied against Mitchell as defendant, but only after the court 
displaced Harris v. Balk, while contradictorily relying on Harris v. 
Balk to negate an arguably governing New York precedent. But 
Mitchell was also the agent of twenty-three garnishees.300 
Enough has been said to establish that, for the order of 
attachment in Falor to be successful, the plaintiff must establish in 
personam jurisdiction over the twenty-three garnishees. Yet the 
only jurisdictional fact in favor of the plaintiffs is service on 
Mitchell, who was making a casual visit to New York, outside the 
scope of his agency as fiduciary for the LLCs. 301 The United States 
Supreme Court has three times decreed that a casual visit is not 
enough, by itself, to ground New York jurisdiction over the 
garnishees.302 Any implication that the New York courts had 
recognize the judgment of the Washington court. Id. at 12. Any subsequent conveyance by 
the husband to X would have been void. But where X was already the owner by the time the 
wife sought enforcement, the Nebraska court was apparently within its rights to deny 
recognition of the wife's title. See id. at 14. 
297 Id. at 12 ("[Full faith and credit] does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one 
State to property situated in another, but only makes the judgment rendered conclusive on 
the merits of the claim or subject-matter of the suit .... Plaintiff seems to contend for a 
greater efficacy for a decree in equity affecting real property than is given to a judgment at 
law for the recovery of money simply."). 
298 See Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Degrees, supra note 291, at 639, 640, 
648. 
299 Fall, 215 U.S. at 9-10, 11-12. 
300 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
301 Id. at 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
302 See supra text accompanying note 14 (stating that three U.S. Supreme Court cases held 
that a visit by an officer of a corporation not otherwise doing business in that state is not 
sufficient for the state to exercise jurisdiction over that corporation). These cases held that 
an officer's casual presence in the state did not suffice to confer personal jurisdiction over the 
corporation. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923); Bank of 
Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 171, 173 (1923); Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. 
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jurisdiction over the garnishees solely by the garnishment of 
Mitchell must be viewed as unconstitutional and barred by 
International Shoe principles.303 
It is familiar law that, where no minimum contacts exist over a 
defendant, the defendant may nevertheless waive jurisdiction by 
making a personal appearance. According to CPLR section 32O(b): 
"Subject to the provisions of subdivision (c), an appearance of the 
defendant is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon 
him, unless an objection to jurisdiction under paragraph eight of 
subdivision (a) of rule 3211 is asserted by motion or in the answer as 
provided in rule 3211."304 CPLR section 3211(a)(8) governs motions 
to dismiss, inter alia, on the ground that "the court has not [sic] 
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant."305 This provision, 
however, has no relevance. The garnishees in Falor were not 
defendants. So they did not have to make what New York law used 
to call a "general" or even a "special appearance."306 · 
Did the garnishees do anything else that constituted consent to 
jurisdiction in New York? They certainly were not parties to the 
guaranty contract, in which the defendants consented to 
jurisdiction.307 They did, however, comply with CPLR section 
6219,308 as garnishees are supposed to do. According to section 
6219: 
Within ten days after service upon a garnishee of an order 
of attachment, ... the garnishee shall serve upon the sheriff 
a statement specifying all debts of the garnishee to the 
defendant, when the debts are due, all property in the 
possession or custody of the garnishee in which the 
defendant has an interest, and the amounts and value of the 
debts and property specified. 309 
The question arises whether submission of section 6219 amounts 
to consent by the twenty-three garnishees to the jurisdiction of the 
New York court. 
303 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (stating that the presence of an 
agent in a state, or even the performance of an isolated activity on the behalf of the 
corporation, is insufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over the corporation). 
304 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 320(b) (McKinney 2013) (emphasis added). 
305 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(8) (McKinney 2013). 
306 CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 100 N.Y.2d 215, 224, 792 N.E.2d 155, 
161, 762 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11 (2003) ("New York no longer distinguishes between a general and 
special appearance .... " (citing C.P.L.R. 320)) . 
3o7 Hotel 77 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 307, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1204, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
30a Id. at 308-09, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
309 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6219 (McKinney 2013). 
ii 
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There is some statutory evidence that submission of a 6219 
statement by a garnishee does not constitute consent to in personam 
jurisdiction over the garnishee. CPLR section 6211(b) governs the 
hearing to confirm an order of attachment that has been issued ex 
parte.310 The first sentence of section 6211(b) does not expressly 
apply when the grounds of attachment is that the defendant is a 
nondomiciliary. 311 According to the second sentence of this 
prov1s10n: 
Where an order of attachment without notice is granted on 
the ground specified in subdivision one of section 6201, the 
court shall direct that the statement required by section 
6219 be served within five days, that a copy thereof be 
served upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall move within 
ten days after levy for an order confirming the order of 
attachment. 312 
Confusingly, this provision assumes that the confirmation 
hearing will be held after the garnishee submits its section 6219 
statement. In Falor, the section 6219 statements were submitted 
long after the hearing had concluded.313 This, however, does not 
appear to be a problem insofar as the defendants are concerned. In 
fact, the Supreme Court, New York County had ordered that the 
levy should not occur until after the confirmation hearing. 314 The 
garnishees, however, have every right to complain about the section 
6211 hearing.315 The plaintiff must move to confirm.316 Motions 
require service of the motion. 317 This means service on the 
garnishee. 318 Service on the defendants after the hearing is over is 
not service on the garnishee.319 
Be that as it may, Mitchell (as defendant) appeared personally 
and through attorneys (for the defendants) at the CPLR section 
6211(b) hearing to oppose confirmation of the order of 
attachment. 320 But suppose we say that he was also there as an 
310 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 62ll(b) (McKinney 2013). 
311 Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6201(1) (McKinney 2013). 
312 C.P.L.R. 62ll(b). 
313 Falor, at 308-09, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (stating that it was not until 
the supreme court had sealed off the record following oral arguments on October 23, 2007 
that Mitchell provided CPLR section 6219 statements to the plaintiff). 
314 See id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
315 See C.P.L.R. 62ll(b). 
316 Id. 
311 Id. 
318 See id. 
319 See id. 
320 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308-09, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 900 
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agent of the garnishees (who had already submitted CPLR section 
6219 statements). As an alternative to simply opposing 
confirmation, fiduciary Mitchell, pursuant to CPLR section 6223(a), 
could have moved on behalf of the garnishees to vacate the order of 
attachment (which was outstanding even if not yet confirmed).321 
According to the last sentence of section 6223(a), "[s]uch a motion 
shall not of itself constitute an appearance in the action."322 Here 
we have some evidence that the CPLR section 6219 statement, upon 
which the CPLR section 6211(b) hearing is predicated, cannot 
constitute consent of the garnishees to New York jurisdiction. If 
moving to vacate is not an appearance, then opposing confirmation 
of the order of attachment is not an appearance either. 
Still, if Mitchell appeared for the garnishees, the court determined 
against the garnishees in the end. 323 As is well understood, a 
special appearance to contest jurisdiction that results in a finding of 
jurisdiction is entitled to full faith and credit, 324 even if it is based 
on the erroneous proposition that service of process on a corporate 
officer casually in New York is enough, without more, to justify 
jurisdiction.325 But this would turn on Mitchell's intent to protest 
the order of attachment as a fiduciary for the garnishees, rather 
than as a defendant. 326 If Mitchell was there only as a defendant 
and the garnishees made no special appearance, any ruling against 
the garnishees is not entitled to full faith and credit. 327 
It is most unlikely that fiduciary Mitchell intended to compromise 
the rights of the garnishees by appearing for them. Rather, it is 
more plausible that Mitchell appeared for himself, or that his 
attorneys appeared for the defendants, but not for the garnishees. 
We learn from the Falor court that: 
[D]efendant Mitchell, pursuant to CPLR 6219, provided 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
321 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6223(a) (McKinney 2013). 
322 Id. 
323 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308, 309, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701-02. 
324 See Vander v. Casperson, 12 N.Y.2d 56, 58-59, 61, 187 N.E.2d 109, 109-10, 111, 236 
N.Y.S.2d 33, 34, 36 (1962) (holding when New York defendants made a special appearance in 
a Florida court to challenge jurisdiction, the defendants are bound by the Florida court's 
jurisdictional determination). 
325 See discussion supra Part II (arguing that the Falor court was in error when it held 
that jurisdiction over the corporate fiduciary extends to jurisdiction over the corporation 
when the fiduciary's presence in the state is unrelated to its' corporate duties). 
326 See discussion supra Part I (relating to Mitchell's dual role of a private citizen 
defendant and corporate fiduciary defendant). 
327 See generally Vander, 12 N.Y.2d at 59, 187 N.E.2d at 110, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 35 ("[A] 
judgment rendered in another State is not conclusive where the person against whom 
judgment entered was not served .... "). 
I 
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plaintiff with garnishee statements for the 23 entities. 
Defendant Mitchell does not dispute that he is the "proper 
garnishee" (within CPLR 5201 [c] [1]) for defendants' 
ownership/membership interests. Nor does defendant 
Mitchell argue that he was improperly served. Defendant 
Mitchell, through counsel, stated in a letter to Supreme 
Court dated January 28, 2008, "[w]e are prepared to waive 
any argument that the proper garnishee was not served with 
the order of attachment or the related levies in this case."328 
But Mitchell also proceeded (as a defendant) to state that the 
order of attachment was improper because the situs of the 
defendants' property was in Delaware, Georgia, and Florida, not 
New York.329 This seems to have been an inarticulate way of 
protesting that the New York courts had no jurisdiction over the 
persons of the garnishees. Thus, the appellate division, which had 
ruled against the order of attachment, remarked: 
The mere fact that the order of attachment in this case 
was served upon defendant Mitchell, a resident and 
domiciliary of Florida, who was in New York temporarily 
solely to attend his deposition and does not dispute that he is 
the proper garnishee within the meaning of CPLR 5201 (c) 
(1), does not establish the situs of the res, i.e., the 
defendants' ownership and/or management interests, if any, 
in 23 entities ... in New York.330 
We read the appellate division as responding to Mitchell's protest 
as a defendant to jurisdiction over the garnishees. We do not read 
this as meaning that the attorneys for Mitchell meant to act as the 
attorneys for the garnishees. If this is the case, the order of 
attachment, to this day, has not yet been established as valid as 
against the garnishees. All we know is that, insofar as the private 
defendants are concerned, the order of attachment was properly 
issued.331 
. Further puzzles arise. For the purpose of this discussion, we 
ignore the fact that, between confirmation of the order of 
attachment and the resolution of the appeal, the supreme court 
issued judgments against the defendants.332 Recall that a levy 
328 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 308-09, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
329 Id. at 308, 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 1207, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701, 702. 
330 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 58 A.D.3d 270, 273, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (App. Div. 
1st Dep't 2008), rev'd, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2010). 
331 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 312, 926 N.E.2d at 1208, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 704. 
332 Id. at 309, 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 701-02. The plaintiffs motion to 
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pursuant to an order of attachment lasts ninety days, after which 
they lapse.333 If the order of attachment in Falor were to lapse, the 
plaintiffs would be required to revive it with a motion nunc pro 
tune. 334 In response to this motion, it should be open for the 
garnishees to make a "special appearance" to protest a lack of in 
personam jurisdiction. Or the garnishees could say nothing, and 
any New York ruling would be disentitled to full faith and credit in 
other states. 335 
Alternatively, it is open, prior to the ninety-day lapse or after a 
nunc pro tune revival, for the plaintiff to perpetuate the levy by 
commencing a turnover proceeding pursuant to CPLR section 
6214(d).336 According to CPLR section 6214(e): 
At the expiration of ninety days after a levy is made by 
service of the order of attachment, or of such further time as 
the court, upon motion of the plaintiff on notice to the parties 
to the action, has provided, the levy shall be void except as to 
property or debts which the sheriff has taken into his actual 
custody, collected or received or as to which a proceeding 
under subdivision ( d) has been commenced. 337 
CPLR section 6214(d) requires the plaintiff to "commence a 
special proceeding against the garnishee served with the order to 
compel the ... transfer to the sheriff."338 A "special proceeding" is 
governed by Article 4 of the CPLR.339 There we learn that "a notice 
of petition shall be served in the same manner as a summons in an 
action."340 Service of the order of attachment on Mitchell was 
certainly not the commencement of a special proceeding against the 
garnishees.341 Service would have to be accomplished anew.342 
confirm the order of attachment was granted on February 8, 2009 and judgment was entered 
against six defendants on April 21, 2008. Id. at 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
333 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(e) (McKinney 2013). 
334 See Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507-08 
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004) (prohibiting second levies and requiring such motions, in the 
context of post-judgment enforcement). 
335 See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 705 (1982). 
336 C.P.L.R. 6214(d). 
337 C.P.L.R. 6214(e) (emphasis added). 
338 C.P.L.R. 6214(d) (emphasis added). 
339 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 401-11 (McKinney 2013). 
340 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 403(c) (McKinney 2013). 
341 See C.P.L.R. 403(a). "A notice of petition shall specify the time and place of the hearing 
on the petition .... " Id. The order of attachment would not have met these criteria and 
therefore would not be considered to have instituted a special proceeding. See Hotel 71 Mezz 
Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 308, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 
(2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008) . 
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Since we are dealing largely with LLCs, CPLR section 311-a(a) 
applies: 
Service of process on any domestic or foreign [LLC] shall be 
made by delivering a copy personally to (i) any member of 
the limited liability company in this state, if the management 
of the [LLC] is vested in its members, (ii) any manager of the 
[LLC] in this state, if the management of the [LLC] is vested 
in one or more managers, (iii) to any other agent authorized 
by appointment to receive process, or (iv) to any other person 
designated by the [LLC] to receive process .... 343 
The words "in this state" in CPLR section 311-a(a) should be read 
to mean that the LLC (and not merely is member or manager) must 
be "in this state" for jurisdictional purposes, not that the agent is in 
the state. 344 Otherwise, the casual visit of an LLC agent would 
subject the LLC (not otherwise present) to New York jurisdiction. 
Such interpretation, we argue, would render section 311-l(a) 
unconstitutional. Such interpretation should be avoided if 
possible. 345 
Suppose the members of the LLCs in question never again come 
to New York, even on casual visits. In that case, the plaintiff would 
have to proceed under section 311-a(b) where it states "[i]f service is 
impracticable under subdivision (a) of this section, it may be made 
in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs."346 
Assuming service is accomplished under CPLR section 311-a(b), 
in the special proceeding that results, the garnishees would again 
have the opportunity to protest lack of in personam jurisdiction. 347 
Or they could simply default, confident that any ruling against 
them would be entitled to no full faith and credit. 348 
Judgments, however, were issued in the meantime, so that, by the 
time the Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the order of 
342 See C.P.L.R. 403(a). 
343 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 311-a(a) (McKinney 2013) (emphasis added). Further rules on serving 
process on LLCs appear in Article III of the New York Limited Liability Company Law. N.Y. 
LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§§ 301-05 (McKinney 2013). 
344 See C.P.L.R. 311-a(a). 
345 E.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012). 
346 C.P.L.R. 311-a(b). 
347 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 404(a) (McKinney 2013). 
348 See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 705 (1982) ("[B]efore a court is bound by the judgment rendered in 
another State, it may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's decree. If that 
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the relevant parties, full faith and 
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attachment, the parties in Falor were in a post-judgment mode. 349 
This circumstance in no way changes the analysis. According to 
CPLR section 6226: "Where an execution is issued upon a judgment 
entered against the defendant, the sheriffs duty with respect to 
custody and disposition of property or debt levied upon pursuant to 
an order of attachment is the same as if he had levied upon it 
pursuant to the execution."350 
Were the plaintiff in Falor to issue an execution to the sheriff, the 
plaintiff would find that the levy under CPLR section 6214(b) had 
lapsed.351 The plaintiff would still be required to revive the levy 
nunc pro tune and commence a special proceeding against the 
garnishees. 352 In the post-judgment context, all of the jurisdictional 
issues could be raised by the garnishees, if the garnishees did not 
appear in the original section 621l(b) hearing on the order of 
attachment. 353 
To summarize, the Falor court's opinion actually decided very 
little. Even if service on Mitchell of the order of attachment was a 
proper levy, the levy must still be enforced. If, as is apparently the 
case, fiduciary Mitchell never intended to subject the LLCs to New 
York jurisdiction, it is still open for the garnishees to challenge 
jurisdiction in a motion to revive the lapsed levy or in the required 
special proceeding to make the levy perpetual. 354 Nothing that 
happened in the section 621l(b) hearing or the subsequent appeals 
estops the garnishees from protesting the lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 355 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, a plaintiff obtained 
jurisdiction over corporate account debtors-the debtors of various 
debtors-by grabbing the person of the corporations' president, even 
though the president was "casually" in New York-that is, present 
for reasons unconnected with the corporations of which the 
349 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 309-10, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1206, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 698, 702 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008). 
"On September 25, 2007, Supreme Court granted the order of attachment in the sum of 
$65,149,926 (the amount secured by the order)." Id. at 308, 926 N.E.2d at 1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d 
at 701. 
350 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6226 (McKinney 2013). 
351 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(e) (McKinney 2013) ("[E]xpiration of ninety days after a levy is 
made by service of the order of attachment .... "). 
352 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5227 (McKinney 2013). 
353 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6211(b) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6223(a) (McKinney 2013). 
354 C.P.L.R. 6223(a); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6221 (McKinney 2013). 
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garnishee was president. 356 Such jurisdiction directly contradicts 
the holdings of multiple Supreme Court cases, 357 not to mention a 
dictum in the famous case of International Shoe v. Washington. 358 
In the course of so doing, the Falor court turned Harris v. Balk on 
its head. Harris involved the location of intangible property.359 It 
stands for the sub-constitutional proposition that, at least in 
Maryland, a debt is located where the account debtor is, and 
jurisdiction over the account debtor establishes quasi in rem 
jurisdiction over the debt. 360 Although Harris is about account 
debtors, the Falor court applied its learning to creditors of the 
account debtor-that is, to defendants. 361 According to the Falor 
court, where defendants are, that is where their intangible property 
is.362 This is the dead opposite of what Harris stands for. Harris 
locates the debt were the garnishee is.363 
Meanwhile, the Falor court used the sub-constitutional 
proposition of Harris to overrule a governing New York precedent-
on constitutional grounds!364 Granted, the old rule from National 
Broadway Bank v. Sampson-a debt is located where the account 
debtor is domiciled-limits the constitutional reach of New York 
courts. 365 It is probably not a very good rule. But there is no 
constitutional reason why New York courts should maximize their 
reach. The overruling of National Broadway Bank therefore must 
be understood as judicial legislation-permissible but not 
cons ti tu tionally required. 
So the Falor opinion violates the Constitution and, in addition, 
changes New York law on faux constitutional grounds. It is 
doubtful that any of this was intended. Rather, the facts in Falor 
were so confusing that the matters simply got mixed up. 
Nevertheless, once the facts get untangled, the unconstitutionality 
of Falor becomes apparent. Corporations and LLCs are not located 
356 Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 307, 308, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1204, 
1205, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700, 701 (2010), rev'g 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep't 2008). 
357 Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923); Bank of Am. v. 
Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 171, 173 (1923); Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. 
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 266, 268--69 (1917). 
358 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
359 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 221 (1905). 
360 Id. at 221, 222. 
361 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 307, 926 N.E.2d at 1204, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
362 Id. at 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
363 Harris, 198 U.S. at 221, 222-23. 
364 Falor, 14 N.Y.3d at 310, 926 N.E.2d at 1206, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
365 Nat'l Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N.Y. 213, 223, 71 N.E. 766, 769 (1904), 
abrogated by Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 900 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2010). 
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where their agents are casually, outside the scope of their agency. 
A corporation is not in New York just because an agent flies to New 
York to take in a Broadway show. Any attempt by the New York 
Court of Appeals to claim otherwise transcends the bounds of the 
United States Constitution. 
